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# THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

BY  
R. PAGE ARNOT.

A Narrative and a Guide for Reading.  
(Second Edition.)

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## PREFACE.

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THIS narrative does not pretend to give more than the main threads of the story, on which the student may string his own reading. There is no attempt at analysis ; and even in the narrative pressure of space has forced me to omit some of the most important matters, while pressure of time compelled me to use again an article written two years ago for the Labour International Handbook ; and there is much in it I would now write in a different way.

Nevertheless, in spite of these detractions, this narrative will be found useful, for the simple reason that there is no other syllabus or short history of the Russian Revolution existing in English. The same applies to the list of books given. For the completeness of the book-lists (which make the fullest select bibliography so far published in this country), I am largely indebted to the knowledge and skill of G. Allen Hutt. But the whole marrow of the subject can be found, without going any further, in the books and pamphlets by Lenin and Trotsky, in John Reed's "Ten Days," and in Price's "Russian Revolution."

It is, perhaps, needless to add that no full understanding of the Bolsheviks, or of the Revolution itself, is possible without an understanding of the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels : but I have considered it unnecessary to put their books into the bibliography.

R. P. A.

*March, 1923.*



## CHAPTER I.

### THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA.

**R**USSIA emerges into history in the Ninth Century when the Viking chief, Rurik, set up his rule amongst a Slav population. During the Middle Ages Russia was cut off from the rest of Christendom, partly by the different form of its religion (derived, like the later Tsardom, from the Byzantine Empire and true heir to its stiffness and servility), and partly through its almost complete subjection to the Mongol or Tartar invaders. By the Sixteenth Century the Tartar invaders had been repelled or subdued and communications were opened up between the Tsar Ivan the Terrible and Queen Elizabeth of England. Under the Eighteenth Century rulers, from Peter the Great, who had laid down the foundations of absolute monarchy after the model of Louis XIV. of France and wrested the hegemony of Eastern Europe from the Swedes, to Catherine II., whose generals, Potemkin and Souvaroff, broke the power of the Ottoman Empire, the power and extent of the Russian Empire was enormously extended and many non-Russian peoples were brought within its territories. Poland was partitioned. Courland and Lithuania absorbed, Moslem Khanates in the East and South-East were conquered, the territories of the Northern and Western Shores of the Black Sea were taken from the Turks, while year after year saw a steady extension eastwards into Siberia, along the Northern March of the Chinese Empire, which continued into the Nineteenth Century until the sea was reached and Vladivostock founded on the shores of the Pacific. Still Russia had remained as it were on the outskirts of Europe—untouched by the influence of the Crusades or the Renaissance, and immune from the effects of any later development—when the wars of the French Revolution and the disastrous invasion of the French in 1812 made the Tsar the leader of the Continental Monarchies, a position which was signalled by his headship of the Holy Alliance. From this time onwards, the strength of Russia began to give anxiety to the other powers of Europe and though the help of the Tsar was gratefully accepted for the crushing of the revolutionary movements of 1848, the policy of the other powers was largely affected by this growing fear. The Crimean War was an attempt to curb the Russian expansion and the British Cabinet right up to 1890, or even later, was continually nervous of the proximity of Russia to Afghanistan which seemed to them to threaten the safety of the British Empire in India. In Persia, too, the southward thrust of the Russian influence caused a continual anxiety which finally led to the Anglo-

Russian Agreement of 1907 over the demarcation of spheres of influence in that country.

It has often been said that the motive of the Russian territorial expansion was the desire for a warm-water sea-port (the Baltic and the White Sea are ice-bound in winter) and that the founding of Vladivostok, the thrust toward the Persian Gulf and the continual yearning for the possession of Constantinople and the Straits are thus explicable. In the Secret Treaty between the Tsar and the Allies of March, 1915, Constantinople was bargained for as the price of Russian support for British and French claims in the Near East, and as late as the autumn of 1916, a speaker in the Duma roused imperialist enthusiasm by his cry that "the Shield of Oleg was still stretched out over Constantinople." It was nearly a thousand years since the unforgotten Viking Oleg had hung his buckler upon the gates of Byzantium.

P. Kropotkin, "Memoirs of a Revolutionist" (Amur chapters, 2nd Ed., 1907, Smith-Elder).

M. Philips Price, "Siberia" (1912, Methuen, 12/6).

J. Mavor, "Economic History of Russia" (Dent, 2 Vols.)

V. O. Kluchevsky, "History of Russia" (Dent, 3 Vols., 28/6).

F. H. Skrine, "Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900" (Cambridge U.P., 7/6).

Beazley, Forbes, & Birkett, "Russia: from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks" (Oxford U.P., 8/6).

## CHAPTER II.

### THE TSARDOM.

A brief summary of the internal condition of Russia at the end of the Nineteenth Century is an even more essential preliminary to a study of the present position. To understand its recent history it must be realised that there existed two Russias, one the Russia of the peasants, released in 1861\* from medieval serfdom and grouped in their villages and conducting a primitive agriculture under the loose organisation of the village Mir, somewhat like the English manor of the Middle Ages, or the village communities of India at the present day. They were almost all unable to read or write, and were intensely ignorant and pious, while their conditions of housing and sanitation, their miserable means of existence, often accentuated by famine and disease, brought a high mortality which was only compensated for by an extreme fecundity which made their birthrate by far the highest in Europe. It is important to note that the so-called "emancipation" of the peasants was due

\* It should be noted that the emancipation of the serfs (at a heavy price to themselves) followed hard on the Crimean war, the erection of a Duma on the Russo-Japanese war, the Socialist-proletarian Revolution on the Great War.

to three economic causes: (a) the requirements of up-to-date large-scale landlords for "proletarianised" peasants, *i.e.* peasants who were not tied to the land and could be taught modern processes; (b) the requirements of industry in the towns for free labourers; (c) the financial needs of the Tsardom, which wanted to tax the small landworker, and particularly to sell him vodka (which was a State monopoly, and from which the Tsardom drew 40 per cent. of its revenue). These in turn suggest to us what were the conditions of the peasantry in this period.

On the top of this Russia of the peasants was super-imposed another Russia, of officials and functionaries, of landlords and merchants, of law-courts and gendarmerie and secret police and spies. This was the Government of Russia which seemed in some aspects to be a survival from the monarchies of the Seventeenth Century and in others to be an actual example of the fabled Despotisms of the Orient. The Tsar was the head of this system, and to him, as absolute monarch, fell the final responsibility. Against this absolute power there had been in 1825 a rebellion of army officers tinged with Western ideas (the Dekabrist), but after the cruel suppression of this attempt the Tsardom under Nicholas I. (1825 to 1855) seemed stronger than ever. In the latter half of the Nineteenth Century there developed a revolutionary movement whose various phases are well portrayed in such writers as Turgeneff, Tolstoi, and Dostoevsky. By 1890 it was possible to divide the revolutionaries (as apart from those Nobles and Landowners who had imbibed "Liberal" ideas) into three clearly marked groups—those who based their doctrines on Marx (these were very few), those who followed Bakunin and other Anarchist Communists such as Prince Peter Kropotkin, and those groups which were afterwards to be known as the Socialist Revolutionaries. It was the last of these who pursued the policy of personal terrorism and endeavoured to alter the Tsarism by their *attentats* with revolver or bomb on the lives of the Tsar and his higher officials.

In many instances they were successful, the most notable being the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. in 1881. But the net result of their policy was a stiffening of the despotism, and ever more savage repression by hanging, flogging, and transportation to Siberia of revolutionaries of every shade of opinion. The Okhrana or secret police were enormously developed in State and Church and in every stratum of society until it became dangerous for a man to whisper his thoughts to his neighbour. This spy system, it appears, is the means always employed by a tyranny to maintain itself in power, and has not been unknown in other countries. But in Russia the Okhrana became so powerful and all-embracing that at last it could be accurately described as a vast secret society which permeated and poisoned the whole of Russian social life. The very Ministers of the Crown were also under continual surveillance

through what was called the Cabinet Noir or Black Bureau, a postal censorship from whose operations not even the members and relatives of the Royal Family were exempt. The existence of this Cabinet Noir was never proved—it had been described in the Duma as a myth—until 1917 when it was found that it had been in continual operation from as far back as the time of Catherine II.

For this section the most useful books for British students to read are not formal histories, but the works of Tolstoi, Dostoievsky, Turgenieff, and their like ; and especially :—

Tolstoi, " War and Peace " (Heinemann, trans. Constance Garnett, in 1 Vol. O.P.).

Dostoievsky, " House of the Dead " (Heinemann, 7/6).

Turgenieff, " Fathers and Children " (Heinemann, 4/-).

Kennan, " Siberia and the Exile System " (Osgood, M'Ilwaine, 1891, O.P., and N.Y. Century Co.).

Gogol, " The Inspector-General " (Walter Scott) ; " Dead Souls " and " Taras Bulba " Cossack Stories (Everyman Library, 2/-).

Stepniak, " Underground Russia " (1883, Smith, Elder, O.P.).

Bernard Shaw, " Great Catherine " (Constable, in " Heartbreak House " volume, 7/6).

See also Wilcox, " Russia's Ruin," Chapters vi. and xiv.—The Okhrana ; Early Career of Lenin (Chapman & Hall).

Mme. N. Jarintzoff, " Russia : the Country of Extremes " (1914, Sidgwick & Jackson).

### CHAPTER III.

#### THE GROWTH OF CAPITALISM.

From 1890 onwards this human society, thus governed, began to undergo a profound social change which was finally to bring about the downfall of the unaltering Tsardom. This change can be described as the coming of Capitalism, with an accompanying unprecedented increase in population. Between 1897 and 1914 the numbers rose from 128 millions to 175 millions. Capitalist industry, largely with the aid of foreign capital, developed with enormous rapidity in the towns, and the need for an urban proletariat was met by immigration from the villages. These urbanised peasants often returned to their villages bringing with them the disturbing and novel ideas acquired by them in their factory life. Thus on the one hand a town proletariat arose, amidst conditions unparalleled except in the worst times of the English Industrial Revolution, and on the other hand the spirit of discontent thus engendered was spread amongst the peasants. To this population of proletariat and peasants the different revolutionary parties maintained distinctive attitudes. The Marxian Social Democratic Labour Party, which was founded in 1898, from previously organised Marxian bodies, concentrated itself upon propaganda amongst the town workers, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries bent their attention upon the peasants.

But from the very beginning of the Social Democratic Labour Party, a division showed itself between a section afterwards defined as the Mensheviks, which considered that a coalition with the bourgeois Liberal Parties against the Tsardom was a necessary stage in the development of Russia, and the Bolsheviks who considered that Capitalism was already sufficiently advanced for the industrial proletariat to be capable of leading a revolution on its own account, and who therefore refused to have any truck with the bourgeoisie. Of the Mensheviks, Martoff, and later Tschheidze and Tseretelli were the leaders. From the beginning Lenin was the most unflinching of those who favoured the Bolshevik policy.

For this chapter again, the most illuminating books are not those of the historians, but of the imaginative writers. See especially Anton Tchekov, all of whose works are a study of the social classes, particularly the bourgeoisie and the intelligensia—"Tales," in 13 vols., trans. Constance Garnett (Chatto & Windus, 3/6 each) and "Plays," in 2 vols. (Duckworth, 7/6 each). For the peasants and the proletariat, see Maxim Gorki, "Three of Them" (Unwin), "Twenty-Six Men and a Girl" (Duckworth), "Through Russia" (Everyman Library), "My Childhood" (Werner Laurie), etc.

There is no satisfactory history in English of the various revolutionary parties. Materials can be found in the Reports (practically unobtainable) of the International Socialist Congresses; and also Appendix VI. of the British Govt. Report, Russia No. 1 (1921—Cmd. 1240).

## CHAPTER IV.

### 1905 AND AFTER.

We return to the external policy and foreign relations of the Tsardom. The policy of Bismarck had been to keep "friendly relations" with Russia, while binding Italy, Austria, and Germany together in the Triple Alliance. In this isolating of Russia, he was able to count on the coldness of Britain, ever anxious about Afghanistan, toward the Tsardom, and in the case of France upon the natural repugnance of the Tsars to the French republican form of Government. The successors of Bismarck had not his ability, and this, coupled with the need of the Tsars for financial aid, began to make overtures possible. In 1892, the Tsar visited Cherbourg and the dual Entente was initiated. Britain maintained her aloofness for more than another decade, until the growing power of Germany was felt as a new menace. Meantime the Russian expansion in Siberia and its penetration of the Northern provinces of China had proceeded apace. The Trans-Siberian Railway was completed, and a line was run down through Manchuria to Port Arthur. Here a new power into the East suddenly began to disturb the Russian Eagle as it made its meal off the carcass of China. The conflict of interests between the two imperialisms ended in the



Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, in which the Tsardom was heavily defeated. This defeat brought about a new occidentation of Tsarist policy, and at the same time the added misery and dislocations of the war brought things to a head inside Russia.

The working-class had already gained considerable experience in organised action. The first semi-political strikes on a large scale took place as far back as 1894, in Petrograd; and their continuation during the following years was actively promoted, encouraged, and utilised by the Social-Democrats, who, being an illegal party, were forced to organise in such a way as to be continually in contact with the workers. Their branches or local groups therefore took the form of factory groups or "nuclei," and were to be found at the back of every industrial movement for partial as well as for general economic improvement. In this they were considerably assisted, during the years 1900-1904, from an unexpected quarter—the police. The latter conceived the idea of organising "legal" trade unions, which would enable them to keep a hold on the workers and divert their activities from subversive to "constitutional" ends. In this they were encouraged by the land-owning element around the Tsar, which had control of the Ministry for the Interior, and cared little for the interests of the manufacturers. For a considerable period these "police unions" had considerable vogue, as the workers speedily transformed them into fighting organisations—the Social-Democrats particularly going into the Unions (secretly) and directing this transformation. It was an organisation of this kind that was founded by the priest, George Gapon, in 1904, and by January, 1905, was able to bring out the whole of the Petrograd proletariat (over 280,000) into the streets to petition the Tsar. The massacre which followed ("Bloody Sunday," January 22, 1905) finally killed all belief in "constitutional" unionism favoured by the powers that be, but the proletariat had taken an enormous step forward in class-consciousness, and the disaster of the war found it ripe and ready for action.

The Revolution of 1905 broke out at first as a series of strikes and then, as the political parties utilised the situation, as a movement of revolt. The revolt spread rapidly, accompanied by movements of disaffection in the Army and Navy. Several vessels of the Black Sea Fleet mutinied and under the leadership of the insurgent crew of the battleship *Kniaz Potemkin* dominated for a brief time the great port of Odessa. The spontaneity of the revolt continued to be derived from the awakened and active condition of the working masses, particularly the town workers, and against all this the counter-revolutionary plans and schemes of the Tsardom were tried in vain. In Petersburg a council of industrial workers was formed (the Petersburg Soviet) which focussed the discontent of the population into a movement for a social revolution. In the leadership of this Soviet (and in other hastily-formed Soviets

throughout Russia) the members of the Social Democratic Labour Party, both Menshevik and Bolshevik, took an active part. The Tsardom for a time was helpless, and eventually an endeavour was made to still the storm by the promise that a Duma or parliament would be summoned.

The situation in 1906 had thus a historical resemblance to the summoning of the Long Parliament by Charles I. The dependence of the Tsar for his revenue upon the Duma made the prospect of constitutional government seem a possibility. Whether or not this was a mirage is difficult to tell. What actually happened was that before the Duma met in the Spring of 1906, the British Foreign Office approved the flotation on the London Stock Exchange of a gigantic Russian loan and so enabled the Tsar to snap his fingers at the Duma. This was the first occasion on which the Stock Exchange had handled Tsarist bonds. The loan was followed by the Anglo-Russian Agreement over Persia, negotiated by Sir Edward Grey in 1907. Thus it helped to build the Triple Entente of Russia, France, and Britain.

The money thus acquired was used to re-establish the shaken autocracy and to crush the constitutional as well as the revolutionary movement. An era of repression set in. Not at any time during the Tsardom was there such savage and violent terrorism. "The Black Hundreds," Corps of what would now be described as "Black and Tans," were organised and let loose upon the unhappy people of Russia. Whole villages were massacred, and pogroms stirred up against the Jewish section of the population. Siberia was the lightest fate which befel the revolutionaries, many of whom found that their activities only served to fasten "Stolypin's necktie" round their throats. The refugees were the lucky ones. By 1909, the Tsardom was firmly in the saddle once more.

From this time onwards, though to Western eyes the autocracy seemed to be re-established, the only question canvassed amongst revolutionaries in Russia was not whether there would be another revolution, but when exactly that inevitable event was likely to occur. The Social Democratic Labour Party held a Unity Conference in London in 1907, and under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, then in the majority, it proceeded to analyse the faults and errors of the Grand Rehearsal of 1905 and to prepare the most definite plans for the future. At the same time the party was purged of the extreme elements of both wings. The Otsovisists who held that only illegal operations should be carried on and that the Party group should be withdrawn from the Duma, and those who went to the opposite extreme of demanding legalised agitation only were both denounced as erroneous.

Meantime, under the "strong rule" of Stolypin, the Government of Russia plunged deeper and deeper into repression and relied more and more upon secret police and agents provocateurs. The re-

volutionary parties were honey-combed with Government Spies and counter-mining in the Secret Service was carried on by the Socialists.

R. W. Postgate, "Revolution, 1789-1906," Chapter vi. (Grant Richards, 18/-).

H. W. Nevins, "The Dawn in Russia" (1906, Harpers).

Savinkoff ("Roshin"), "What Never Happened" (Allen & Unwin, 1919), 7/6.

English Walling, "Russia's Message" (1909, Fifiield).

Trotsky, "Our Revolution," 1904-1917 (1918, N.Y., Henry Holt).

Kropotkin, "The Terror in Russia" (1919, Methuen).

Zinovieff, "Life of Lenin," B.S.P. 7d.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE WAR AND ITS EFFECT.

The Tsardom was in this rotting condition when the European War broke out in 1914. We are not concerned here with any discussion of the part played in this by the Tsar and his ministers. But the military history of the war has a direct bearing on the internal condition of Russia. The Blockade of Russia began in 1914, with the stoppage of German imports and the closing of every other means of ingress except what little could filter through the Trans-Siberian Railway, or come down the single track line from Murmansk. Then was seen the difference between an industrialised and manufacturing country and an agricultural and raw materials country forced to import its manufactured goods. It was an engineers' war. This meant that Russia was counted out in the second round. Her mere weight of men and initial reserves of ammunition made possible the inroad into East Prussia and, after this had been repulsed by Hindenburg at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, the push in the Spring into Galicia with the capture of Lemberg and Przemyśl; but by the late Spring of 1915 the ammunition of Russia was exhausted, her armaments were defective, her organisation in pieces and her peasant conscripts in many cases had not even the rifles wherewith to defend themselves against the exterminating fire of the German and Austrian battalions. Her bolt was shot. The degree of disorganisation almost exceeds belief. It is on record that on single track lines the railway trucks which had delivered their loads were actually derailed in order to enable later trains to be brought to the terminus. The great retreat of the Summer and early Autumn of 1915 dealt a final blow to the prestige of the Tsardom. For a period a renaissance of nationalist enthusiasm amongst the manufacturing classes brought forward the production of munitions of war, but this was accomplished at the expense of other forms of manufacture essential for home production.

Russia had been exhausted before. The net result of this final effort was to make recovery from that exhaustion impossible.

The day of Revolution drew nearer. The embassies of the Entente became anxious and Lord Milner was sent over in the winter of 1916 to report on the situation. It was just at this moment that the assassination of Rasputin, the favourite of the Empress, by certain noblemen had flared out over the dark sky of Russia like a presaging comet. Lord Milner returned to report that there was no danger of revolution. Within a few weeks of that the Tsar had abdicated and the revolution had begun.

- M. Phillips Price, "War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia" (Allen & Unwin, 8/6).  
 Michael Farbman, "Russia and the Struggle for Peace" (Allen & Unwin, 5/-)  
 N. Nordman, "Peace Problems: Russia's Economics," Part ii. (1919, Putney Press, O.P.).  
 White Paper, "Russia," No. 1 (1921, 2/-). Cmd. 1240, esp. paragraphs 37, 285-290.  
 K. Leites, "Recent Economic Development in Russia" (Oxford U.P., 7/6), Part I. (N.B.—Extreme Anti-Bolshevik prejudice).  
 "Letters of the Empress Alexandra to Nicholas II. (text in English). (1922. "Slovo" Publishing Co., Berlin).  
 Gen. Loukowsky, "Memoirs of The Russian Revolution," Part I. (T. Fisher Unwin, 12/6, 1922).  
 Major-Gen. A. Knox, "With the Russian Army, 1914-17," (2 vols., Hutchinson, 1922, 36/-).  
 Gen. N. de Monkévitz, "La Décomposition de l'Armée Russe, 1917-18. (Paris, Payot).  
 Gen. J. Hanbury-Williams, "The Emperor Nicholas II. as I knew him." (A. L. Humphreys, 1922).

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE MARCH REVOLUTION AND THE DUAL CONTROL.

The Revolution began in Petrograd with a strike movement of the working-class population who were suffering starvation through the failure of the bread supply. The regiments sent to suppress the revolt joined the strikers, and immediately the Tsardom collapsed. A change of monarch or a regency was advocated by the Duma party, headed by Rodzianko and overtures were made to the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaevitch, but events moved too rapidly for any such compromise. A Provisional Cabinet was got together from the Duma parties; the strife between the classes, the land hunger of the peasants, and the desire for peace became the main issues; questions of the form of government receded into the background and the complete liquidation of Tsarist Russia was begun.

From the moment the curtain falls upon the slow and sombre drama of Tsardom, the stage becomes crowded with actors and events succeed one another with breathless rapidity. To present

even a summarised description of this is impossible. All that can be done is to make clear what were the governing factors in the Revolution as it proceeded, and to enumerate the more salient events which throw light upon these tendencies. In the first place the relations between the Soviets and the Provisional Government must be understood. The workers of Petrograd and other towns, who had begun the revolt, organised themselves in Councils (Soviets) which were of an exclusively working-class character. They were drawn for the most part from the natural groupings of the workers in the factories and workshops and, as the delegates sat for short term periods, were able to express directly and immediately any change of attitude amongst the masses of the workers. The Soviets of peasant deputies and the Soviets of soldiers' deputies were similarly constructed. The Soviet had emerged as an instrument of working-class democracy during the 1905 Revolution, and in its re-emergence in 1917 we see the same features of flexibility and vigour. In all its working there was a high degree of improvisation, and this, while it sometimes yielded what seemed chaotic results, enabled it to embody the will of the workers in a rapidly changing situation in a way that was impossible for a static or rigid institution. Naturally it took some time for bodies so new to work out a settled policy.

The Soviets, though the mainspring of revolution, did not yet feel sufficient confidence in themselves or their leaders to take over full control. Accordingly they submitted themselves to the leadership of persons drawn in the main from the middle class parties of the Duma. The Duma, however, had by the beginning of the war become completely unrepresentative—the aggregate of peasants and workers' votes counted for less than the votes of the wealthy classes and the nobility—and any government formed from it was discounted from the outset. It was agreed on all hands that the first acceptable Government would be formed by the summoning of a Constituent Assembly. Meantime the Government of Russia was perforce to be a dualism in which the nominal supreme control of the Provisional Government, based upon the old Duma parties, was continually subject to the growing power of the Soviets, representing directly the desires of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. It was the Petrograd Soviet which sent out the call for the summoning of an International Socialist Congress, which should bring about an immediate "PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXATIONS AND WITHOUT INDEMNITIES." This at once produced an issue of supreme importance, and though the Provisional Government had to acquiesce in this demand there were members of it, such as Miliukoff, then in charge of foreign affairs, who went flat against this policy and continued to assure the Allies that the imperialist aims of the Tsardom, as expressed in the Secret Treaties, would remain unaltered and that the prosecution of the war for these



purposes would be continued. From this cause came continual dissension, and though the Soviets were willing, under the domination (in the towns) of the Mensheviks, to maintain the unsteady partnership, it became increasingly clear that the dualism could not continue. For a time the two powers in Russia played off the future Constituent Assembly against one another. In the main the Soviets were for its speedy election, while the Provisional Government played for its postponement. But from the beginning Lenin, and the majority of the Bolsheviks, had pointed to the development of the Soviets as the future instrument of working-class government; and, under his leadership the immediate abolition of the dualism was demanded in the cry, "ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS." In this the Bolsheviks were pursuing their pre-war policy of refusing any coalition with the bourgeois parties. They maintained that the downfall of the Tsardom had at once resolved the opposition into its constituent elements and brought the class struggle to the front in its acutest form. For the moment, however, the Menshevik policy of coalition was accepted, but the movement of events was steadily in favour of the Bolshevik propaganda.

Wilcox, "Russia's Ruin."

Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International," S.L.P., 1/-; "Towards Soviets," B.S.P., 2d.

Lenin and Trotsky, "The Proletarian Revolution" (New York, 1918, Communist Press). A clever sequence of articles, written by the two leaders in 1917.

Trotsky, "The Bolsheviks and World Peace." N.Y., Boni and Liveright, 1918.

R. Palme Dutt, "The Two Internationals" (for Zimmerwald and Kienthal), Labour Publishing Company, 2/6.

R. W. Postgate, "The Workers' International" (L.P.C., 2/6).

Labour Party, "Annual Report, 1918" (for Stockholm Reverberations).

Farbman, "Russia and the Struggle for Peace." 5/-.

Gen. A. I. Denikin, "The Russian Turmoil" (Hutchinson). Chapters iv.-vii., also for the Dual Control, chapters x.-xiii.

In FRENCH:—

M. Paleologue, "La Russie des Tsars pendant le Grande Guerre," Vol. III. (Paris, Librairie Plon).

(Formerly published in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," a vivid and interesting account of the March Days and the Tsar's abdication, from the viewpoint of a French diplomat exclusively interested in the continuance of the war).

Maxim Gorky, "Ecrits de Revolution," Part I. (1922, Paris, Stock, 6 fr 75. c.).

(Contains speeches, articles from "Novaya Zhizn," etc., not otherwise obtainable except in the original Russian files).

## CHAPTER VII.

## KERENSKY AND KORNILOFF.

In response to the pressure of the Entente, Alexander Kerensky, the Minister for War (and later Premier), succeeded by his speeches in stimulating the army to a fresh effort, and in June, under General Brusiloff, the Russian armies made a great drive forward into Galicia. The effect on the Allied Governments, who judged events in Russia from the standpoint of the war, was re-assuring. Inside Russia, where everything was judged from the standpoint of the coming peace, the effect was far otherwise. A mass revolt took place on July 3-4. The movement was purely spontaneous. The Soviets (Menshevik majority) were officially against it, and the Bolsheviks did not take part in it until they were convinced that it was not a forced or conspiratorial movement, but a really popular rising. It was sternly put down by Kerensky and his generals who suppressed the Bolshevik newspapers, and imprisoned Trotsky and the other prominent Bolsheviks. Lenin was forced to seek refuge in Finland.

Scarcely was this incipient civil war crushed when another party, this time the extreme Right, attempted to seize the supreme power. One Korniloff, a Tsarist general, marched on Petrograd with a number of picked regiments. His object was "to restore order" and his success would almost certainly have meant the suppression of the Soviet if not the restoration of the Tsardom. In this attempted coup d'état it appears that Korniloff had the secret support of certain sections of the Allied Governments, who, it must be remembered were in constant touch with the Russian embassies with their unchanged Tsarist personnel. Kenerski, after some parleyings, finally declared himself against Korniloff. Korniloff was defeated, but the circumstances of this second civil war made it clear that in increasing chaos and breakdown of government the resort to arms would be relied upon as the effective means of determining events.

Farbman, "Russia and the Struggle for Peace."

Trotsky, "History of the Revolution to Brest Litovsk" (Allen & Unwin, 2/6).

Lenin, "Lessons of the Russian Revolution" (B.S.P., 3d).

M. Philips Price, "My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution" (Allen & Unwin, 18/-).

Denikin, Op. cit. Chapters xiv.-xx., Strategic position—Demoralisation of the Army; xxii., xxviii.-xxix., The July Offensive; xxx.-xxxii., Korniloff.

Loukowsky. Op. cit., Part II., including the formation of the "Volunteer Army."

Kerensky, "The Prelude to Bolshevism: the Korniloff Affair," (Unwin, 10/6). (A piece of patent special pleading).

Maxim Litvinoff, "The Bolshevik Revolution" (B.S.P. 1/3).

Maxim Litvinoff, "Russian Plan for the League of Nations," (P.R.I.B., 1918. 2d).

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION.

Meantime the refusal of the Allies to discuss war aims on the basis of No Annexations and No Indemnities, the failure to promulgate the law to give the land to the peasants, and the steadily increasing misery and famine brought matters to a head.

The Bolsheviks, who had been chary of joining in the July rising, waited until they could feel assured that the masses of the proletariat were ready to revolt. Signs of this assurance were not wanting. In the "Democratic Conference," summoned by Kerensky in the last days of September to base his retention of power upon some expression of general assent, it was found that the great majority of the representatives of the Trade Unions were Bolsheviks. They waited, however, for the elections to the All Russia Congress of Soviets. In these Soviet elections it had been found that Petrograd, like Paris in the Great French Revolution, led the remainder of the country. Accordingly, when the Petrograd Soviet in September returned with an overwhelming Bolshevik majority, the immediate transfer of all power to the Soviet was resolved upon forthwith. The revolutionary seizure of power, under the direction of the Military Revolutionary Committee, began.

On November 7th, Kerensky fled the capital, and within a few days, and with relatively little fighting, the revolution was successful. The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets met and elected a Council of People's Commissars with Lenin as chairman, and Trotsky in charge of Foreign Affairs. The dual control had passed away, and Russia had become the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

**They immediately set to work destroying the capitalist order to its foundation. This caused such a cloud of misrepresentation abroad that it was almost impossible for the workers in other countries to see what the Bolsheviks were doing or to realise that they were beginning to build a Socialist order.\* They had a very definite programme of Socialist reconstruction, as well as a very real understanding of the obstacles with which they were faced. This theory of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism (which cannot be dealt with further here) should be studied specially. The most important book on it is "The State and Revolution," by N. Lenin.**

\* It is important here to note that during the days immediately following the revolution, the Bolsheviks repeatedly endeavoured to enlist the other Socialist parties—the Mensheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries—in the work of emancipating the proletarian and peasant masses, by offering to form a Coalition Workers' Government, pledged to a Socialist programme (all power to the Soviets, peace, land to the peasants, workers' control of the factories, and armament of the workers), in which they themselves would

## [ THE REVOLUTIONS :—

- Lenin, " Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power ? 1917." (L.P.C., 1/6, 1922).  
 Lenin, " The State and Revolution." (B.S.P. and S.L.P., 1919, 7d).  
 Lenin, " The Lessons of the Russian Revolution " (B.S.P., 1918, 3d).  
 Lenin, " The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade " (Communist Party, 2/-).  
 John Reed, " Ten Days that Shook the World " (Boni & Liveright, New York ; 1922, cheap edition, 5/-).  
 William Hard, " Raymond Robin's Own Story." (Harpers).  
 Files of " The Herald " and " The Call," 1917-8.  
 Meriel Buchanan, " Petrograd, City of Trouble " (Collins, 6/-).  
 Louise Bryant, " Six Red Months in Russia " (Heinemann).  
 A. Rhys Williams, " Through the Russian Revolution," (L.P.C., 7/6).  
 J. Sadoul, " Notes sur la Revolution Bolchévique " (Paris, Editions de la Sirène, 1919).  
 Trotsky, " War or Revolution " (S.L.P., 1918, 3d).

## THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND THE PEASANTS :—

- Price. Op. cit. Chapters vi.-viii., xi., xvii., xx.  
 Bucharin and Preobrazhensky. " A.B.C. of Communism." (Communist Party, 5/- and 3/-).  
 " Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., " with Decree on Workers' Control. " Daily Herald," 6d. Special Edition (with Commentary), by the Information Dept. of the R.T.D. (L.P.C. 5/-, to be published).  
 " The First Code of Laws " (Socialist Information and Research Bureau, 1920. 9d).  
 " Russian Documents " (International Conciliation, No. 136). American Association for International Conciliation (New York).  
 Lenin, " Land Revolution in Russia " (I.L.P., 6d).  
 Maurice G. Hindus, " The Russian Peasant and the Revolution " (N.Y., Henry Holt).  
 C. Roden Buxton, " In a Russian Village " (L.P.C., 3/6).  
 Maxim Gorky, " Ecrits de Revolution," Part II. (" Novaya Zhizn " articles of early 1918).

## CHAPTER IX.

## BREST-LITOVSK.

The first task of the Soviet Republic was to make its exit from the Imperialist War, and it was of the utmost importance to the existence of a Socialist State in Russia that the proletariat of the world should be aroused by that exit being made as fully revolutionary as possible. A recital of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations will illustrate this, and at the same time, apart from their intrinsic importance, will bring out with extreme clearness the sharply defined characteristics of the Bolshevik policy. Immediately after the assumption of power, the Soviet Government issued by wireless their proposals for an armistice on all fronts as a

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retain half the Ministries (including those of Labour, the Interior, and Foreign Affairs). The attempt fell through owing to the fact that the non-Bolshevik parties interpreted the offer as a sign of weakness, and insisted on the elimination of Lenin and Trotsky from the Government.

preliminary to a general peace. The Embassies of the Allies having refused to recognise the new régime could give no official or responsible answer.\* The German Government responded, and after a cessation of hostilities, an armistice was negotiated. The conclusion of the terms of the armistice, which included the fixing of the armies in their respective positions and an interdiction on any transfer of the troops of the Central Empires to the Western Front, were delayed until a further appeal could be made to the Allies to join in a general armistice preliminary to a general peace. To this appeal, no reply of any kind was given. Accordingly, negotiations for a separate peace began on December 20th, 1917.

The Soviet plenipotentiaries tabled certain general principles of the proposed peace, which they declared must be a peace without annexations and without indemnities; this was to mean that the position of the parties before the war was to be resumed, except that subject nationalities were to be given their independence, and that individuals who had suffered from the war were to receive reparation from a common fund to be contributed to by all the belligerents in a proportion. All negotiations were to be open, and their daily progress published by wireless.

On Christmas Day, 1917, these general principles of the Peace were accepted by the Central Empires, Bulgaria, and Turkey. How far this was a concession to the working-class feeling of Germany, or how far it was regarded as a piece of the normal diplomatic bluff is difficult to say. Within a few days, however, it became clear that Court Czernin the Austrian, and Von Kuhlmann the German, had no intention of regarding it as a serious basis, and that they intended "to reap the fruits of victory" in full. To their surprise, and to the astonishment of the rest of the world, the Bolsheviks as stoutly maintained these basic principles and at once rounded on their enemies, accusing them of personal deceitfulness, inspired by a policy of naked imperialism. The relations of the two sets of negotiations passed rapidly from an attitude of ironical conciliation to one of undisguised aversion.

The Russian plenipotentiaries withdrew to Petrograd for further instructions and when they returned they were reinforced by the presence of Trotsky, whose unrestrained invective against the schemes of imperialist robbery still further embittered the relations of the parties.

\* The French and British embassies however sent a message to General Dukhonin, Kerensky's commander-in-chief, who had not accepted his supersession by the Soviet commander Krilenko, informing him that the Allies most strongly objected to any cessation of hostilities, and strongly urging him to a further prosecution of the war. This was the occasion of an outspoken warning by Trotsky that the intervention of any foreign government in the internal affairs of Russia would be strongly resented and would lead to the gravest complications.



Meantime a continual propaganda was carried on by both sides amongst the troops. But the propaganda of the Bolsheviks was enormously superior in its appeal ; it reached the civil population of Germany ; and it was not Von Kuhlmann or the Kaiser to whom the men of Brest-Litovsk addressed their speeches, but the labouring masses of Germany and the Austrian Empire. For a time the German negotiators and their associates were completely in the dark. They did not know what was happening, and seemed to think that the Russians, being Socialists, were simply intolerable spouters, men so wrapped up in their opinions, so lost to a sense of reality that they could not refrain from declamatory speeches in the council chamber. They even thought that these speeches were made for home consumption in Russia for the purpose of smoothing the path to the acceptance of the German terms. It is on record that Count Czernin drew Trotsky aside at one point in the long-drawn-out discussion and asked him, " Would it help you if we were to issue an ultimatum ?" To him the Bolsheviks appeared to be playing a game, while he and his fellow-diplomats, employing their time in detaching the representatives of the Ukraine, attended to the serious business of the negotiations.

Suddenly their diplomatic illusions were shattered. The working people of Austria and Germany, penetrated by the socialist appeal of the Bolsheviks, began to move. A series of enormous strikes broke out in Vienna, in Berlin, in Hamburg, and all over the country. For three years the workers of Germany had suffered privation and hardships ; but so long as they could be persuaded that their rulers were intent only on defending the Fatherland, they appeared willing to submit to an unending war. The debates of Brest-Litovsk opened their eyes. It was in a real passion of war-weariness that the working-class of Germany downed tools and the sailors of the Battle Fleet broke out in open mutiny. It was a revolutionary political movement ; it was very nearly the proletarian rising which would have stopped the war.\* Trotsky had indeed been playing a game, though in another sense than Von

\* How eagerly the Bolsheviks had looked for a rising may be judged from a message sent by the Petrograd Soviet to the Councils of Workers' Delegates in Vienna and Berlin.

" Brothers, the news has filtered through to us of your glorious fight against German and universal imperialism. The workers and soldiers of Petrograd have welcomed the news with transports of indescribable enthusiasm. Brothers and companions in arms, by your strikes and demonstrations, and the creation of your Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, you have shown that the Austro-German working-class will not allow the hangmen and spoilers to impose a peace of violations and annexations on the Socialist Republic of the Soviets.

" Civil war in Russia is nearing its end in the complete victory of the social revolution. The destined outcome of the peace pourparlers is being decided not at Brest-Litovsk, but in the streets of Berlin and Vienna and other German

Kuhlmann and Czernin imagined. It was a dangerous game, and he was within an ace of winning it.

Of the two main factors operating behind the ostensible negotiations, the fomenting of a revolution in Germany is one. The other cardinal point to be borne in mind is the fomenting by Czernin and Kuhlmann of a defection by the Ukrainian Rada from the Russian side. The Rada was the parliament of the Ukrainian National Republic recognised by the Bolsheviks as autonomous within the Russian Federal Republic. This Rada was unlike the Soviet Régime in that it contained representatives of all classes. And for this reason it had been recognised and financed by the Allies. The Germans and Austrians, however, discerned in its composite character a chance to break the solidarity of the Russian Republics. Just as the Bolsheviks had hoped for the breaking of the Central Empires by a working-class revolution, so their opponents counted on the opposition of the Rada to a Soviet government proving stronger than the claims of patriotism or the hatred of a foreign enemy. From the very beginning of the negotiations they began to work upon the Rada. On January 11th, they had got so far that the Rada plenipotentiaries announced at Brest-Litovsk that the Ukraine had now taken up its international existence as an independent state. By the end of the first week in February, their efforts were finally successful. The Rada accepted the German-Austrian terms (which were equivalent to a German suzerainty over the Ukraine),† and signed a separate peace on February 9th, 1918.

This was the first separate peace to be signed and was the more remarkable because the Allied recognition and aid which had been refused to the Russian Soviet Government had been freely conceded to the Rada. The Russian diplomatic front had been pierced; the front of the Central Empires had been shaken, but remained intact. The Soviet Government had lost in its first struggle with imperialism. Nevertheless, the struggle was desperately continued.

A new tone had now appeared in the Brest-Litovsk discussions. To the deadly arguments and exposures of Trotsky, his adversaries now replied with the traditional mailed fist. The civilian negotiators were thrust aside by the figure of General Hoffman; the world was informed that the military victors meant to grasp all the spoils of victory. The terms of the German peace were dictated to the Bolsheviks who had nothing to do but to sign. This they resolutely refused. Instead, they broke off the negotiations,

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and Austrian cities. Brothers, we cordially believe that you will do all that is possible to ensure that the peace pourparlers shall end in pourparlers between the Russian Workmen's and Peasants' Government with the German Government of Liebknecht."

† It was described by the President of the Rada delegation as "a democratic peace that is honourable for both Parties."

issued an order of demobilisation and decreed that the state of war was at an end. But sign the "peace of robbery and violence" they would not. They returned to Petrograd, to report on their efforts to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.

This did not suit the Germans' book. On February 18th, they declared the Russo-German armistice at an end, and without waiting for the expiry of the seven days' notice, resumed the war. Accordingly, the armies of the Kaiser advanced steadily into Russia to compel the signature of the Treaty. The immediate result on the Russians was twofold, accordingly as they were town dwellers, workers in the factories amongst whom the revolutionary ideas had taken root, or were countrymen, either recruited into the army or tilling their fields. In the former case there was a fierce rally to fight, "Wilhelm and the gang of imperialists"; from the factories masses of workers debouched into battalions of the new Red Army; and the approaches to Petrograd were speedily manned with volunteers. Everything in the towns resembled the enlistment of the *sansculottes* in '93; now, too, the approach of a reactionary German army found hearts burning for the Revolution. The countrymen on the other hand were for peace at any price. The actions of the Commissars' Councils and of the Central Executive inclined hither and thither according as they realised the mood of the town workers and the mood of the peasant army. Now they heard of the awakened spirit and indomitable front of the arming proletariat, now of the complete demoralisation of the regular troops and their blank refusal to fight; and so one day they issued stirring appeals to the old army to maintain its position, and to the townspeople to form a new Red Army, and the next day would send out a wireless in which they despairingly accepted the German terms. During this period of frenzy help against the Germans was sought from the French, British, and American Embassies or agencies. In each the agent was sufficiently impressed to recommend his government to help; in each case the help was refused. Finally, by a narrow majority, the Bolsheviks were persuaded by Lenin ("We must accept; their knee is on our chest") to submit to whatever terms were offered; the Central Executive Committee, with a majority of Bolsheviks on it, submitted in its turn, and on March 2nd, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed.\* A fortnight later (March 17th) it was confirmed by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

Price. Op. cit. Chapters xii.-xv., xvi.

Sadoul. Op. cit.

Hard. Op. cit.

J. L. Magnes, "Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk." (N.Y. Rand School, \$1). Documents.

\* It was of this second treaty that Mr. Lloyd George spoke when he said, "We shall neither accept nor impose a Peace of Brest-Litovsk." But see Keynes or any other writer on the Versailles Treaty.

## CHAPTER X.

## THE CAPITALIST POWERS ATTACK THE REVOLUTION.

Up to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk it appeared possible to observe a thread of continuity in the succession of events. But with the conclusion of that Peace the public attention of the world ceased to be focussed on any particular series of incidents, and in consequence the history of the succeeding nine months, up to the German Revolution and the Armistice, appears a medley of confusion and tumult. There is marching and fighting in all the Russias; from the Polish border to the Pacific, and from the High-Pamirs to the Arctic Ocean we hear of sporadic hostilities of Germans, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, British, Japanese, Chinese, and Czecho-Slovaks; the territories of the Tsardom are gradually disintegrating and as they revert to their national or racial elements there appears in each a foreign invader or an adherent of the old régime. Assassination is rife; the German Ambassador perishes in this way, an attempt is made on Lenin, the rumour of plots by the staff lead to an attack on the British Embassy in which Captain Cromie is shot.

In any endeavour to disentangle these confusions it is useful to remember that there were three main standpoints amongst the governments concerned. These were the attitudes of the Central Empires, the Allies, and the Soviet Government respectively. The Germans and their associates regarded the Soviet Government as definitely *hors de combat* and their attitude seems to have wavered between a desire to crush it, inspired by their political aversion to Bolshevism, and a calculation that Russia was less likely to recuperate so long as it remained a Soviet Republic. Their desire to prevent the Red Republics, however weak, from spreading was carried out in Lithuania, Livonia, and Courland, where the Baltic Barons (as the Germanised upper-classes and large proprietors were termed) were given full power and socialist activities were suppressed, and also in Finland where dissensions between the Reds and the Whites had now reached the pitch of civil war. The Whites appealed to the Germans for help; the independence of Finland was recognised by the Germans at the same time as negotiations were initiated for the establishment of a Finnish monarchy with a German Prince as King; and German soldiers were poured into Helsingfors. Within a couple of months the majority of the more active Reds had been exterminated or cast into prison and General Mannerheim was securely seated as Regent with the assistance of German bayonets.

The Ukraine the Germans frankly regarded as a protectorate whose harvests and production must be used for the benefit of the Germany military machine. At the same time they pushed on past the Dnieper and Don (leaving a Hetman, Skoropadsky, to govern

the country under the surveillance of Field-Marshal Von Eichorn) to Odessa and the northern shores of the Black Sea. Here they began to occupy territory within the bounds of Soviet Russia and returned no satisfactory answer to the repeated remonstrances of the Soviet Government. Their Allies, too, the Turks, pushed up in the Caucasus, attacking the Russian forces and turning an equally deaf ear to the Moscow wireless.

To the Germans and their Allies the problem of the former Russian Empire was capable of a three-fold solution—political, economic, and military. Firstly, it was important for them to keep the Central Government of Russia as weak as possible (co-operation with it having proved out of the question), to utilise for this purpose the hatred of the Bolsheviks amongst the border states and in the outlying territories where the anti-Bolshevik Russians had an influence and by this means to build up a German hegemony on the Baltic and the Black Sea.

Secondly, it was their purpose to gain the harvests of the Ukraine and the Odessa régime and to supplement their command of the Rumanian petroleum by a seizure of the oilfields of the Caucasus. Thirdly, the disabling of Russia and the pact with the Finnish Whites made it possible to plan the establishment of a submarine base on the Arctic Ocean just as the possession of the Black Sea littoral made a base for repulsing the upward thrust of the British troops in Mesopotamia or even, in the imaginations of the more adventurous soldiers, for opening the high-road to Persia and Hindustan.

The attitude of the Allies is less capable of definition. There was a surface attitude, an attitude assumed in their public utterances, one in which some of the allied troops were induced to believe. There was another attitude representing the real policy of the Entente powers. The surface attitude began with such a concentration of aim upon the successful prosecution of the war as almost inevitably precluded any understanding of the Revolution. The twelve months that had elapsed since the abdication of the Tsar still found them insistent on the anti-German war in oblivion of the fact that to the Russians of every party the war had become of minor importance compared to the maintenance or overthrow of the Revolution; and in this attitude even such an event as the open adherence of Miliukoff, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the German side appears to have left no impression upon them. This and other similar happenings, such as the Finnish German understanding, in no way disturbed the *idée fixe* that the Bolsheviks were German agents and that Russian territory must continue to be treated as a theatre of war. Further, it must be remembered that the Allies found themselves taking their information about Russia and its possibilities from the staffs of the Tsarist Embassies, the refugees from the Cadet Party and other political groups, and the representatives of the border nationalities, all of which infor-



mation was coloured by the extreme antipathy of the informants to the Soviet Government. All this explains how it was possible for men like the French Captain Sadoul to attempt the hopeless task of getting an understanding between the Revolution and the Entente.

The other attitude was unreasonable. There were already sections of growing influence inside the Entente Governments who needed no emigrés to tell them something was rotten in the State of Russia, to whom a socialist society existed only in order to be crushed. They agreed with Mr. Churchill's view that the Bolsheviks were a worse enemy to civilisation than the Prussians themselves. They were the strongest sections, they controlled and conducted foreign policy, and it was they who really determined the attitude of the Allies.

Accordingly, without any attempt to reach an understanding with the Russian Republic, a British Expedition was landed on the Murman Coast, a Japanese force occupied Vladivostok, and British troops advanced into Siberia. In each of the territories thus occupied (as had already happened in the places seized by the Germans) an anti-Soviet Russian Government was set up or supported. One of these Governments meeting at Ufa in the West of Siberia and representing certain portions of the dissolved Constituent Assembly\* with Avksentieff at its head, claimed a primacy amongst the various anti-Soviet nuclei. In all these centres there were forces equipped and supported by the Allies whose ostensible design was against Germany, but whose real purpose was to make an end of the Russian Soviet Republic.

Under all these circumstances it is not difficult to guess the attitude of the Soviet Government. A parallel in some aspects with the French Revolution has already been suggested. To the Bolsheviks the parallel was complete. Once again, as in '93, they saw a young Republic imbued with revolutionary principles, eager for the emancipation of mankind; once again, they saw it attacked by the Old Order whose very existence it had challenged and encircled by States which forgot their mutual animosities in a common desire to crush out the earth-shaking spirit of revolution. Thus, undoubtedly, did the events of 1918 present themselves to

\* The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly has not been dealt with in the narrative, partly because the importance of this episode has been much exaggerated. As will have been apparent, the reality of the situation in 1917 was the dual control and the struggle for power between the Provisional Government and the Soviets. In this struggle, which divided Russia, the Constituent Assembly of the future became a pawn in the game. When it finally met in January, 1918, the dualism had already been resolved, and the cry of ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS had become a fact. The new institution, embodying the principles of Western democracy, had come too late in Russia. When it refused to recognise the Supremacy of the Soviets, it was promptly dissolved.

the men of the Soviets and on the surface it was difficult to find any manifest indication to the contrary, any utterance even which could disabuse them of this conviction.

**The economics of Soviet Russia, the Social Revolutionary rising, the Story of the Civil War and "Military Communism" (all omitted here) should be carefully studied. The best books (together with a cloud of witnesses) are as follows :—**

Lenin. "The Soviets at Work" (S.I.R.B. 6d). "The Chief Task of Our Times," and "The Great Initiative" (S.L.P., 3d).

Kautsky, "Terrorism and Communism" (National Labour Press, 2/-).

Trotsky, "Terrorism and Communism" (Reply to above, published by the L.P.C. as "The Defence of Terrorism," 3/6).

Millutin, "The Economic Organisation of Soviet Russia" (Communist Party, 1/-).

Leo Pasvolksy, "The Economics of Communism" (Macmillan, 12/-).

Price. Op. cit., Chapter xx. (The S.R. rising), and "Capitalist Europe and Socialist Russia" (B.S.P., 4d).

Sadoul. Op. cit., pages 392-414 (The S.R. rising).

Trade Unions in Soviet Russia. November, 1920. L.R.D. and I.L.P. Information Committee (L.P.C., 1/6).

Young, "British Consul Replies to Anti-Bolshevik Slanders" (P.R.I.B., 1919, 3d).

"Eyewitnesses." So picturesque an event as the Revolution naturally produced a crowd of "eye-witnesses," each giving his own impressions of life in Russia. With few exceptions, their books add little to the information otherwise available, illustrating more the effects of the Revolution on the mind of observers. A representative selection would include the following :—M. Barber, "A British Nurse in Soviet Russia" (Fifield, 1/6); H. N. Brailsford, "The Russian Workers' Republic" (Allen & Unwin, 5/-); J. S. Clarke, "Pen Pictures of Soviet Russia" (Communist Party, 4/6); W. T. Goode, "Bolshevism at Work" (Allen & Unwin, 1919, 3/-); M. E. Harrison, "Marooned in Moscow" for prison life (Thornton Butterworth, 1922); G. Lansbury, "What I saw in Russia" (Parsons, 1920, 4/6); Labour Party Delegation Report (Labour Party, 1920, 2/-); C. L'E. Malone, "The Russian Republic" (Allen & Unwin, 1920, 2/6); Sylvia Pankhurst, "Soviet Russia as I saw it" ("Workers' Dreadnought," 1921, 2/6); J. Pollock, "The Bolshevik Adventure" (Constable, 1919, a humorous work); Arthur Ransome, "Six Weeks' in Russia" and "The Crisis in Russia" (Allen & Unwin, 2/6 and 6/-); Bertrand Russell, "The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism" (Allen & Unwin, 1920, 6/-); Clare Sheridan, "Russian Portraits" (Cape, 1921, 10/6); Ethel Snowden, "Through Bolshevik Russia" (Cassell, 1920, 5/-); H. G. Wells, "Russia in the Shadows" (Cassell, 1920, 5/-).

## CHAPTER XI.

### PRINKIPO, KOLCHAK, ETC.

After the Armistice the attack by the capitalist powers was intensified. But in the first few days of the Peace Conference, Wilsonism was allowed its fling. Four days after the opening of the Plenary Peace Conference at Paris, the Allies decided to invite "every organised group that is now exercising, or attempting to

exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives (not exceeding three for each group) to the Prinkipo Island, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the Associated Powers." This decision was greeted very coldly by a large section of Fleet Street and the Parisian Press. It was obviously a *démarche* which, however it may have corresponded to the feelings of the masses in each country, was unacceptable to the most influential military and diplomatic circles. It was not surprising, therefore, that the various anti-Soviet Russian Governments at once replied refusing the invitation. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, expressed its willingness to negotiate, while the border nationalities, such as Esthonia, Lettland, Lithuania and the Ukraine, seeing in the proposal the possibility of final recognition of their independent status—a recognition which Kolchak and the adherents of the former Empire would not concede—finally accepted the invitation. Despite these acceptances and the Peace Offer of the Soviet Government, conveyed to the Paris Conference by an American named Bullitt, nothing further was heard of Prinkipo.

To this abandonment of the scheme for a settlement of Russia, the military situation supplies the necessary commentary. The end of the winter found the Soviet Republic in an extremely unfavourable position. It was not merely a question of continual attacks on the Southern, Western, and Baltic borders of Russia plus counter-revolutionary movements in the outlying districts. In the south, in addition to the activities of Generals Krasnoff and Dutoff at the head of the Cossacks of the Don and the Caspian, the armies of General Denikin, operating in conjunction with French, Greek, and Rumanian detachments on the line of the Dniester, had pushed up from Odessa in a wide fan, the eastward tip of which lay upon the lower Volga. In the North, the British forces had moved from Archangel down the Petchora and the Dvina until it seemed possible that their advance together with the British warships on the Baltic and the activities of the Finns would succeed in freeing Northern and North-Eastern Russia from Bolshevism. But as the Spring advanced the most formidable enemy of the Republic appeared to be the forces under the command of Kolchak. Admiral Kolchak was the successor of the Constituent Assembly Government of Siberia. On the 18th November, 1918, the Directorate of this Government was dissolved by a coup d'état, several of its members cast in prison and a dictatorship assumed by Admiral Kolchak, with the title of Supreme Ruler. He re-organised the fighting forces of the counter-revolution and began a westward move towards Moscow. One after another the strategic positions in the West of Siberia fell before him, the border into European Russia was crossed and the line of the upper Volga approached. As his successes grew,

the other provisional governments began to recognise his supreme authority. Finally, when the star in the East seemed to be nearing its zenith, the Allied and Associated Powers (France, Britain, Italy, United States, and Japan) sent a dispatch promising their assistance to Admiral Kolchak and stating their terms. The dispatch, which was dated May 26th, 1919, began thus, "First as soon as the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his Associates reach Moscow. . . ."

Alas, by the time the Allies had made this decision Kolchak's troops were already in full retreat. The latter part of May had seen a complete reversal of the position on the Siberian Front, and the Red Armies had begun that steady drive eastwards for over a thousand miles, which ended at Irkutak with the complete disappearance of the counter-revolution as a military force. The repulse of Kolchak was followed by a series of rapid blows at the armies of Denikin, and a consequent contraction of his frontiers.

Meantime the southward movement of the Archangel troops to Vologda there to meet the right wing of Kolchak's army had convinced British workers that the "rescue of the Murmansk force" was being made a pretext for a deliberate invasion of Russia. A strike of the Triple Alliance was threatened and the labour agitation thus begun culminated in the summons to an international general strike for July 21st. The strike was only effective in a few countries, but enough had happened in the early summer to make it clear that the organised workers looked on Russia and the Russian problem with very different eyes from the views of the dominant sections of the Governments. They were no longer willing to acquiesce in what seemed to them the suppression of a Socialist Republic for the crime of being Socialist. Whether or not they were really so sympathetic to Russia as they appeared to be, and as the leading Trade Unionists felt they were, is hard to say; suffice it that the fear of action by British Labour was a real stimulus to the War Office to hasten the withdrawal of the troops from Archangel. The British Fleet, however, remained in Soviet waters and remained active.

"Fighting without a War," by Ralph Albertson. N.Y., Harcourt, Brace, & Howe, 1920.

René Marchland, "Allied Agents in Soviet Russia" (P.R.I.B., 1d).

Francis McCullagh, "A Prisoner of the Reds," especially Appendices on the Whites (John Murray).

John Ward, "With the Die-Hards in Siberia" (Cassell, 10/6).

Loukowsky. Op. cit., Part IV., especially chapter x. (on the "political" mistakes which led to the failure of the Volunteer Army).

A. Rhys Williams. Op. cit. Chapters on Vladivostok and beginnings of intervention.

C. E. Bechhofer, "In Denikin's Russia" (Collins, 10/6).

Chicherin, "The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-9" (B.S.P., 4d).

Bullitt, "The Bullitt Mission to Russia" (New York, B. W. Huebsch).

"Hands off Russia" Committee. Sundry publications, including "Peace with Russia."

## CHAPTER XII.

## TRADE AGREEMENTS AND WARS.

By the winter of 1919-1920 it was clear that the abandonment of the policy of a universal peace had only served to strengthen the Soviet Government. Accordingly an attempt was made to re-introduce the peaceful policy by negotiating, not a peace, not a diplomatic agreement, but a trade agreement with the Russians.

Trade with Russia, it was decided, should be permitted through the medium of the co-operative organisations. This was on the 16th of January. Throughout the remainder of the year 1920, the negotiations for trade followed an alternating course, responding always with a strange exactitude to the shifting military situation of Eastern Europe. The Polish offensive of the spring coincided with a congratulatory telegram from King George to Marshall Pilsudski; the conclusion of the Russo-Polish peace preliminaries and the utter defeat of General Wrangel's forces in the late autumn were followed by a renewed activity in trade negotiations. At one point the Russo-Polish crisis brought Great Britain and France to the verge of a declaration of war against the Russian Soviet Republic, but hostilities were averted by the threat of a general strike and the formation of Councils of Action. Between these acuter crises there were repeated occasions when everything seemed agreed between the two parties to the Trade Agreement; all difficulties seemed to have been overcome; but on each occasion something intervened to prevent the conclusion of the Trade Agreement. By the beginning of July, 1920, the principles put forward by the British Government had been accepted by the Soviet Government. It was not till nine months later that the Agreement was signed.\*

Four years after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, in the conference at Genoa, the representatives of Soviet Russia again met the representatives of Capitalist Powers. The procedure at each conference was oddly parallel. Each had been preceded by high-sounding moral declarations; as each proceeded the mask was dropped. What happened at Brest-Litovsk we have already seen. At Genoa, suffice it to say that the British, French, and several other Capitalist Governments, after four years of wars, levied against Soviet Russia, from which Soviet Russia had emerged victorious, now coolly demanded the restoration and restitution of private capitalism in Russia as the price of a treaty of peace.

\* One of the difficulties in the conclusion of the Agreement was the British Government's insistence that the Soviet Government was in a position to prevent the revolutionary propaganda of the Communist International in Britain, and that it must do so as a preliminary to trade. In February, 1921, it was discovered that the British Government had been fostering counter-revolutionary propaganda in Russia, and that the British Police had actually been responsible for a forged edition of "Pravda," which was to be distributed in Russia, with a view to causing risings against the Soviet authority.

They were sent to the right-about by the Soviet Government, which made it quite clear that the Socialist Soviet Republic had to be treated as an equal.

The Lausanne Conference of 1922-3 was a similar example of the undeviating pursuit by Soviet Russia of Communist ends (in this case the following out of the famous Colonial and Nationalist Thesis) and the ensuing clash between the representatives of Socialist Russia and the Capitalist Entente.

**We have made no attempt at summary of the rise and progress of the Communist International, of the wars after 1919, or of the Famine of 1921. But these, especially the first, are of fundamental importance, and must be studied. Books and other references (magazines being important) are given below, and also after the last chapter.**

Loukowsky. Op. cit., Part V. (Wrangel).

"Livre Rouge" (Relations of Russia and Poland, 1918-1920—Official documents); (Moscow, 1920).

"Attacks on Russia during 1921" ("Hands Off Russia" Committee, 1/-). Genoa, "Russian Notes and Thesis"—"Russian Information and Review," 1st April, 1st May, and 1st June, 1922. (Final Reply to the Allied Note of May 2nd).

Hague, "Interview with Russian Delegation" ("Hands Off Russia" Committee).

Lausanne, "Russian Memorandum," R.I.R., January 6th, 1923.

#### THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS :—

Bechhofer. Op. cit., especially Chapter ii. on Georgia. J. Shaphir, "Secrets of Menshevik Georgia," (Communist Party, 1/6). Kautsky, "Georgia : a Social-Democratic Peasant Republic" (National Labour Press, 5/-). Trotsky, "Between Red and White" (Communist Party, 2/-).

#### IN FRENCH :—

Loris-Melicof, "La Révolution Russe et les Nouvelles Républiques Transcaucasiennes" (Paris, Alcan, 1920). Varandian, "Le Conflit Arméno-Géorgien" (Paris, Flinikowski, 1919). La Chesnais, "Les Peuples de la Trans-Caucasie" (Paris, Bossard).

## CHAPTER XIII.

### SOVIET POLICY, 1917-20.

In order to understand the later developments in Soviet Russia it is necessary to turn back to the years 1917-1920, when the new rulers of Russia had to face the chaos left by the Tsardom (primitive industry and agriculture disorganised by war) and had to frame their policy in accordance with military, political, and economic circumstances.

Military necessity was the first factor in deciding policy. Under this supreme pressure was evolved a form of exchange which was



called by the name of "Military Communism." The original bargain between the peasants and the proletariat had been that the Soviet Power would give the peasants the use of the land, and would exchange the products of industry for the products of the soil. To that bargain military necessity said no. Not only the products of the soil, but the whole of the products of heavy industry had to be requisitioned for the needs of the Red Army. The bargain had to be transformed. Instead of receiving the products of industry, the peasants received the protection of the Red Armies against their returning landlords, and in return for this protection all grain beyond the needs of the peasant family was requisitioned for military purposes. Needless to say, though the peasants in a mass understood the implications of the bargain, else Kolchak would have conquered, as individuals many of them resented the requisition of grain, just as in every country throughout the war the farming element resented any interference with the famine prices brought about by the operation of increased demand.

The consequence of this policy was that for three years throughout the whole of Russia there was no buying or selling. Grain was grown and reaped, and the whole of the surplus was taken by the State for distribution as rations amongst the army, the munition workers, and the rest of the population. There was a war on. The result was "military communism."

Political necessity was the second factor. The first effect of the Bolshevik revolution was complete sabotage on the part of all the professional classes and technically skilled strata of the middle class. It is on record in the flood of memoirs of 1917-1918 that have been published in this country that for two months, for six months, for eight months after November, 1917, no one of the intellectual circles of Russia believed that the Bolshevik régime would last for more than a couple of days longer; many of them living in Western Europe hold that belief still. A belief of this kind is the mainspring of sabotage. This sabotage had to be broken down, and in the case of all the small businesses of merchants and traders and small manufacturers, whose houses and premises were full of counter revolutionary activity, political necessity demanded their immediate expropriation. Thus the Soviet Government by the need of striking down its adversaries found itself compelled to nationalise on a large scale.

Nor was this necessity distasteful to them. In the first flush of revolutionary activity there seemed no limit to the things that could be immediately nationalised; no reason for caution in expropriating every single expropriator. This, though natural enough, would not of itself have been a sufficient reason for the eminently realistic minds of the Russian Communistic Party, but for another circumstance; that circumstance was their conception of a world

revolutionary front. In the light of this conception, enormous risks had to be taken, every possible measure had to be forced through, in the expectation that the workers of other countries would rise in revolt, and with their much greater technical equipment, skill, and organisation, enable Russia to pass rapidly through the transition stages from primitive agriculture to State Socialism, and from that beyond. This alone explains the ever-increasing cataract of paper money which ruined the bourgeoisie of Russia, frustrated the speculators and huxters, and made merry with the whole bourgeois apparatus of credit, promissory notes, bills of exchange, bank notes, etc. They could afford to do it. They were drawing on the bank of European revolution.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

#### CRONSTADT.

By the winter of 1920 the defeat of Wrangel had relieved the pressure of military necessity; the abortive seizure of the Italian metal factories had marked the end of the revolutionary mood of the workers of other countries, while the crisis of political necessity had been diminishing even since the summer of 1918. This alteration of the situation had no immediate effect on policy. A large section of the Bolsheviks seemed to have imagined that it was possible to carry on "Military Communism" when the war was over. Even iron and steel can get fatigued. Much more so flesh and bone. To exact the same toll of unwearying effort from individuals as had been given to save the revolution in the time of utmost need might seem manifestly impossible. It was not manifest. Thousands of the Russian Communist Party wished to persist in a policy which, inevitable in war-time, was bound (in an undeveloped Russia) to ruin production, antagonise the peasants, and restrict the area sown for corn. The working-class party of Russia was in the saddle; the wounded steed of Russian industry and Russian resources would not fail to carry them so long as the Revolution was in danger; but the danger that had acted like a spur was over. Russian industry sank in final exhaustion. The Bolsheviks were flogging a dead horse.

They received a rude awakening. The fortress of Cronstadt revolted and in the province of Tambov there was a peasant rising. Of course there had been White plotters at work, and money and arms had been poured in from Paris. But there have always been, and for years to come there will be, White Guard activities. The serious aspect of Cronstadt and Tambov was that the Whites had found a basis of popular support, or rather that the Communists had begun to lose it. For months materials had been accumulating for an explosion, and Cronstadt was the flash point.

Never had the Revolution been in greater danger than in the Spring of 1921, nor was any previous crisis so difficult to deal with. The difficulty lay in the fact that mistakes in face of the military enemy were at once perceived and immediately remediable, but mistakes on the economic field were not to be so simply discovered and dealt with. There were so many other factors which could be given as the reason for the decline in production and the falling away of the peasants. The singular thing about the Russian Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. was that they *were* able to understand and take advantage of Cronstadt. Their action is perhaps unique in history. After prolonged discussion in congresses, the whole party, with the exception of a minority, recognised the heavy defeat they had suffered on the economic field, proclaimed their error and initiated the New Economic Policy. It is true that several of the best known members of the party, notably Lenin, had as far back as the spring of 1918 laid down the lines on which the Socialist Republic was to have proceeded, had not the civil war intervened. It is also on record that, at the first sign of peace in 1920, Trotsky, in the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, proposed an economic policy which as nearly as possible corresponded to that actually adopted a year later. But even if it be acknowledged that the most far-sighted of the Bolsheviks had proclaimed this policy long before, and had, as it were, merely waited until military and other circumstances permitted its carrying out, it is none the less a most remarkable thing that a whole party should have been capable of this complete reversal of their previous socialist strategy.

André Morizet, "Chez Lénine et Trotski" (Paris, La Renaissance du Livre, 1922)—Part II., Section I.

## CHAPTER XV.

### N. E. P.

There are various ways of describing the New Economic Policy, but the simplest and also the most accurate description is to treat it as a renewal of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasants on a new basis. The basis of military communism had broken down. The basis of socialist exchange of the products of heavy industry for the products of the soil was now a thing far off, to be worked towards step by step. The actual basis meantime was to be the substitution of a Food Tax for the requisition *en masse*. The peasant was to give a stated proportion of his harvest to the Soviet Government, who would with this revenue maintain the expenses of Government and defence; with the remainder of his harvest he was free to deal. The effect was to stimulate the production of corn, by making the peasant a free dealer with his surplus. From this

inevitably arises petty trading and buying and selling. Further, the peasant with this surplus buys his agricultural implements, and the simpler tools such as sickles and nails can be turned out by small manufacturers. This again led to the denationalisation of small businesses, and following on this revival of private small capitalist production and of buying and selling, there revived with it all the apparatus of petty trading and some of the apparatus of big business. Banks, shops, etc., opened once more on a profit-making basis. Everything had to be submitted to the commercial test, and accordingly this meant a progressive denationalisation, not merely of small factories, but also of some of the largest works, and even of branch lines on the railways. The ordinary capitalist test of "Will it pay?" had to be applied everywhere. Finally, the re-establishment of the credit and financial system of capitalism had to be tackled, the rouble had to be stabilised, and the State budget balanced by means other than the emission of paper money. The Soviet State had to retreat very far to contract the area of its operations, and leave the field to profitmaking and private enterprise. Instead of the repression of petty bourgeois production and the substitution of State production, petty production had to be revived in order that without any leaps it should develop gradually through all the stages of concentration of capital, and so ripen towards a socialist order. From a superficial point of view, it could be described as a return to capitalism. This was what was entailed by the new bargain between the peasants and the proletariat.

There are, however, certain important modifications. This revival of capitalism is not the same as unrestricted, uncontrolled, private capitalism of Britain 150 years ago. The development takes place under control. It is conditioned by a code of labour legislation affording fuller protection to the workers than exists in any other country. It is accompanied also by a particularly favourable treatment of the Co-operative movement, which enables it to compete to an extent undreamt of in this country with all forms of capitalist production. Again, in some of the heavy industries, State Trusts or mixed State and Private Trusts, comparable to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in this country, have been established. Above all, the dictatorship of the proletariat remains, and in its present form does not merely mean the restriction of the franchise to workers and peasants, or the control of the Red Army. The dictatorship of the proletariat has an economic basis in the control of all the railways (with direct administration of the main lines), control of foreign trade (with monopoly of certain products), control of certain heavy industries, and control of education. Nevertheless, the field left to the Soviet State is now very small.

It is easy to make the above statement as to the revival of capitalism and the qualifications of that revival, but it is difficult

to measure its real meaning by any Western analogy. It is so easy to say, as the British capitalist press say, "Communism has been abandoned," and that Russia is now evolving in the same way as Japan or India. Really to understand the present position of Russia we must have an entirely novel conception of a society. We must think of it as a sort of race, a race run between reviving capitalist production on the one hand (with its growing political weight), and, on the other hand, the working-class State, making its effort to control that revival, learn lessons from it, and keep ahead of it. It is a class struggle of an infinitely complicated and difficult nature.

There is a further qualification of the statement that Russia has adopted capitalism. That is the existence of the Russian Communist Party, and the recent history of that Party. Clearly the effect of reviving capitalism, of renewed profiteering, of large fortunes rapidly made, and of all the other phenomena constituted an extreme danger for the Party that governs Russia. The Communist Party itself might be corrupted, both individually and as a whole. A capitalist Russia is being evolved under the guardianship of representatives of the working class. Who is to see that these guardians will perform their task assiduously? *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* To that most difficult of all questions the answer of the Communist Party was given within a few months of the promulgation of the new policy. The answer was a Party cleansing. The numbers of the Communist Party which had stood at something like 600,000 were ruthlessly cut down within a few months to 386,000. For a year no new entrants were accepted. Special courses were instituted to see that every member was capable of performing the infinitely more difficult duties now laid upon him. If the Communists were the salt of the Revolution, that salt must not lose its savour. The situation was faintly parallel to the Directory from '94 onwards in the French Revolution. The Bolsheviks were resolved to avoid anything analogous to the corrupt régime of the Directory period.

The New Economic Policy is too recent for English books to have been published upon it. Information must therefore be sought principally in magazine articles. See especially Lenin. "The Meaning of the Agricultural Tax" (in the "Labour Monthly," July, 1921), and Lenin and Trotsky's Speeches at the Fourth Communist Congress in "After Five Years" (Supplement to the "Communist," Dec. 16th, 1922). Also "Labour Monthly," from July, 1921; "Russian Information and Review," from October, 1921; "Atlantic Monthly," Oct. and Nov., 1922, articles by Louis Levine; and "Manchester Guardian Commercial Reconstruction Supplement," No. 4 (articles by Soviet officials); and "Russian Economic Supplement" to all issues of this publication.

For facts and figures, see "The Restoration of Agriculture in the Famine Area" (L.P.C., 5/-); League of Nations, "Report on Economic Conditions in Russia" (Constable, 1922, 2/6); and Jonas Lied, "Sidelights on the Economic Situation in Russia" (Moscow, 1922).

## CHAPTER XVI.

## THE PRECURSOR OF WORLD REVOLUTION.

The final qualification is provided by the international situation. It is still a case of Socialist Russia against the Capitalist world. We may contrast the position of two countries, each of which had a revolution in the closing years of the war. In Germany the revolution was not carried through. The German Majority Socialists, it is true, constituted the Government, but the structure of society remained capitalist. Over that capitalism they had not been able to exercise any effective control; on the contrary they were controlled by that capitalism, and used by it until, its purpose served, they were thrust aside to make way for a purely capitalist government. To-day the working-class of Germany is defeated and broken, with no hope of ending their miserable lot. The Russian working-class is defeated, but not broken; and the class struggle there is being resumed under conditions that give a reasonable hope of success.

The New Economic Policy, therefore, though a revival of capitalism, does not mean indiscriminate capitalism like Germany, or South America, or India. For this reason there can be no agreement between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia, either at Genoa, or at the Hague, or at Lausanne. It is for this reason that the workers and peasants of Russia still reckon themselves to be opposed by all the forces of the bourgeoisie inside and outside Russia, not only Governments but political parties as well. Thus they would reckon the Second International amongst their bourgeois enemies, they would say that the Socialists of the Second International, beginning by supporting the imperialist war, were having now to compromise with capitalism, and that the compromise has been the compromise of slaves, whereas the compromise of the Soviet Russians has been the compromise of free men. By that compromise, the Second International, they allege, is in effective alliance with the capitalists; and they point out that the British Labour Party passed a resolution of protest against the trial of the Social Revolutionaries who were convicted of assassination in Russia, but made no attempt to protest against the trial, before hostile judges, of the two Irishmen who had killed Sir Henry Wilson.

The New Economic Policy for the Bolsheviks has not meant the abandonment of the social revolution. The significance of Russia is still that it is a precursor to the world revolution.

**The Communist International.**

The chief sources of information are the reports of Congresses and "The Communist International," a two-monthly magazine, issued as the official organ of the Comintern Executive Committee. It is published in folio from Smolny, Petersburg, in Russian, French, German, and English; but it is not

easily procurable in this form as the police do not allow its entry into this country. Four of the earlier numbers, however, have been reprinted in this country and, with one exception, may be had from the C.P.G.B. The latter numbers now appear regularly.

The bibliography of the Congresses is as follows :—

**First Congress, March, 1919.** The full report is published only in German and Russian, so far as I am aware. But the main thesis (by Lenin), entitled "Bourgeois Democracy and the Proletarian Dictatorship," is printed in No 1 of "The Communist International" (C.P.G.B., 1/-), and also separately (W.S.F., 1½d). The first Manifesto is given in Postgate's "The Bolshevik Theory" (Grant Richards, 7/6), and in "The Two Internationals," by R. Palme Dutt (Labour Publishing Company, 2/6).

**Second Congress, July, 1920.** The full report, in English, gives the debates, the manifesto, the statutes, and the first and final versions of the theses. The "Theses and Statutes" (including the Twenty-One Points, but not the manifesto on "The Capitalist World and the Communist International"), were reprinted here separately (C.P.G.B., 1/-); it was for this publication that Albert Inkpin was sent to gaol for six months. The separate theses, such as "The Agrarian Question" and the "Theses on Colonial Countries," were issued at 2d each. There is also a truncated version of the debates available in this country. With the matter of this Congress may be taken the Comintern statement to the I.L.P. negotiators, issued at 2d, under the name of "Moscow's Reply to the I.L.P." by the Left Wing of the I.L.P., and also published by the I.L.P. itself; and also "Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disease," by N. Lenin, 1920 (C.P.G.B. 2/-). Following on the Comintern Congress comes the "Report of the Baku Congress of Eastern Peoples," September, 1920 (Smolny).

**Third Congress, June, 1921.**—Besides the full English report, which is rather rare, there is a very unsatisfactory abridged version (C.P.G.B., 1/6) of the debates. The voluminous "Theses and Resolutions" were printed here separately. The most important are the Trotsky-Varga thesis on "The World Economic Situation," the thesis (by Lenin) on "The Work of the Russian Communist Party," and the various organisation theses.

**Fourth Congress, November, 1922.**—Of this Congress, which dealt with Programmes, A Workers' Government, and other questions, the report is reprinted here, unfortunately in an abridged form. The theses are already in the press. With this Congress should be taken the "Thesis on the United Front," issued by the Comintern Executive in December, 1921, and confirmed at the Extended Executive of February, 1922. ("Labour Monthly," 1922, and "Communist Review," 1922). Between the Third and Fourth Congresses falls the "Report of the Congress of Toilers of the Far East," February, 1922 (Smolny).

Besides these official reports, the Comintern publishes a very considerable library of books, booklets, and pamphlets, including most of the recent writings of well-known Communists, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Zinovieff, Radek, Bucharin Varga. Only some of these are available in English, but there is no space to give a list. Nearly all are obtainable in German through the Hamburg firm of Karl Hoym. A Jahrbuch (year-book) of over 1200 pages (price about 25/-) has been issued in German and French. Later edition may be in English also. This gives basic facts, and is a revolutionary rival to the Statesman's Year Book. Current politics are dealt with in the International Press Correspondence, Friedrichstrasse 248 Berlin (price 6d), published weekly or oftener in German, English, and French. A good short statement on the Third International is R. Palme Dutt's article in the new Encyclopedia Britannica. I have made no attempt to suggest books dealing with the national sections of the Comintern, but, of course, they are necessary for a full study. But the bibliography for a full study lies outside my scope.

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